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ABSTRACT
Gorton and Huang (2001) argue that private coalitions of banks can act as central banks, issuing
private money and providing deposit insurance during times of panic.  This lender-of-last-resort role
depends upon banking panics occurring, because the threat of liquidation makes the private bank coalition
incentive compatible, inducing banks to monitor each other.  But, despite the evolution of private bank
coalitions, government central banks and government deposit insurance schemes historically replaced
the private bank coalitions.  In this paper we ask why this transition from private arrangements to public
arrangements occurred.  We survey the historical and international evidence on panics, suggesting that
Gorton and Huang (2001) are consistent with the evidence.  Then, we extend Gorton and Huang (2001)
to show the welfare improvement brought about by a government central bank replacing private bank
coalitions as lender-of-last-resort.  In particular, panics, while necessary for private coalitions to function,
are costly because they disrupt the use of bank deposits as a medium of exchange.  With government
deposit insurance, panics do not occur, but the government must monitor banks.  Such monitoring by the
government is not as effective as private bank coalitions.  We provide conditions under which the
government can avoid the costs associated with panics by implementing deposit insurance and thereby
raise social welfare. 
Gary Gorton
The Wharton School










Central banking is a twentieth century phenomenon.  According to Capie (1997), there were only 
eighteen central banks at the beginning of the 20
th century.  By 1950 there were 59 central banks 
and by 1990 there were 161.  At the beginning of the 20
th century, the U.S. Federal Reserve 
System was not yet established; this would occur in 1914.  The Bank of Canada came into being 
after the Great Depression, in 1934.  Prior to the 20
th century central banks were established as 
institutions with monopoly rights over money issuance.  But, if a critical element of central 
banking is the function of lender-of-last-resort, then these institutions generally did not become 
central banks until later, typically during the 20
th century.  For example, although the Bank of 
England was established in 1694, it did not behave as a lender-of-last-resort until much later (see 
Lovell (1957)). 
Explicit government deposit insurance is an even later development than lender-of-last-resort role 
of government central banks.  In 1980 only sixteen countries had explicit deposit insurance 
programs; by 1999, sixty-eight countries had such programs (see Garcia (1999) and Demirigüç-
Kunt and Sobaci (2000)).  In the United States, deposit insurance was adopted in 1934 and in 
Canada in 1967.  Today, in Germany, deposit insurance is still a private scheme, set up and run 
by the banks themselves.  As with central banking generally, not only is deposit insurance late in 
developing, but also there is substantial cross-section variation in whether it is private or public. 
While the spread of central banks in the 20
th century is likely related to the growth of activist 
monetary policy, it has been difficult to explain the origin of central banking.  According to 
Goodhart (1985), central banks evolved as a response to the inability of the banks themselves to 
cope with panics.  There was a natural evolution because some private banks assumed special 
roles in the capacity as the government’s bank.  These banks “evolved” into central banks.  West 
(1974) and Timberlake (1978) focus on the origin of the Federal Reserve System, relating it to the 
real bills doctrine.  Livingston (1986) argues that the Federal Reserve System came into being as 
part of the rise of finance capital, a manifestation of class struggle.  Smith (1936) argues that 
central banks came into being as a tool to raise revenue for the government, but says little about 
the lender-of-last-resort role of central banks.  In the case of Canada, Bordo and Redish (1987) 
argue that the origin of the Bank of Canada was essentially political; there was no economic 
rationale.  Indeed, it is not an oversimplification to say that political explanations predominate 




Why was central banking, by which we mean the lender-of-last-resort function, late in 
developing?  Why did it develop in some countries first and not in others?  Similarly, why is 
deposit insurance such a modern institution when panics have happened for some time in some 
economies?  Gorton and Huang (2001) argue that the development of a central banking role as 
lender-of-last-resort, and deposit insurance, is intimately connected to the industrial organization 
of the banking system.  Central banking first developed as a private response to problems in 
banking systems with many small, undiversified, banks.  In such banking systems, uninformed 
depositors need to monitor their banks.  Briefly, depositors know the state of the macroeconomy, 
but not the idiosyncratic state of their own bank.  The way to check on a bank is to ask the bank 
to convert its demand deposits into currency.  But, banks as a whole cannot do this and then the 
banking system faces liquidation.  In response to this, banks form coalitions that can turn illiquid 
loan portfolios into liquid claims and convince depositors that the banks, as a group, are solvent, 
even if a depositor’s particular bank may not be.  This is the lender-of-last-resort function.  But, 
these problems do not arise in banking systems with a small number of well-diversified banks.  
Such banking systems do not experience panics or high bank failure rates.  Notably, as in the case 
of Canada, discussed below, they also did not develop central banks or adopt deposit insurance.  
These observations are important because they strongly suggest that banking panics are not a 
manifestation of an inherent problem with banks per se.  We review the historical evidence 
further below. 
The logic of the Gorton and Huang (2001) model closely follows the U.S. experience with panics.  
In the U.S., private bank clearinghouses issued private money called “clearinghouse loan 
certificates” during panics.  These certificates functioned as a form of deposit insurance from the 
point of view of depositors because they served to convert claims on a single bank into claims on 
the group of banks in the coalition.  For depositors to accept these certificates, they must be 
convinced that banks will coinsure each other.  The coinsurance system only works if there are 
banking panics.  Banking panics impose externalities on the banks doing well, forcing them to 
subsidize and monitor the banks that are not doing well.  Monitoring via the coalition is more 
efficient than without the coalition because not all banks are closed in the panic.  The coalition 
distinguishes banks doing well from those doing poorly, closing some of the latter banks and 
altering the incentives of other poorly performing banks.  Banking panics play a critical economic 
function in enforcing the incentive compatibility of bank coalitions.  Also, in order for the bank 




enforce reserve and capital requirements.  This monitoring is the historical origin of bank 
examination and supervision. 
To summarize, Gorton and Huang (2001) make three related points.  First, banks are not 
inherently unstable institutions prone to panics.  Rather, the likelihood of bank panics depends on 
the industrial organization of the banking system.  A system with a few large, well diversified, 
banks is a very different system than one with many small, undiversified, banks.  In the latter 
system, panics occur.  Second, banking panics serve an economic function since they correspond 
to depositors monitoring banks, which induces coalitions to engage in self-monitoring.  Third, 
private bank coalitions are a more efficient way for monitoring to occur, but the coalitions only 
function if panics occur.  Private bank coalitions functioned as lenders-of-last-resort and provided 
a form of deposit insurance (as described below). 
To assess these arguments we begin by surveying some of the historical evidence on the 
incidence of panics and the industrial organization of the banking system.  We also look briefly at 
private bank coalitions.  Private bank coalitions seem to have been most formally developed in 
the U.S., though other countries also had such coalitions, less formally, or in combination with a 
government central bank.  The argument of Gorton and Huang suggests that government central 
banks would develop first as lenders-of-last-resort in countries where the banking system 
consisted of many, small, undiversified banks.  These systems would experience panics and 
would form private bank coalitions.  Economic historians have not explicitly looked at this rather 
complicated set of issues, but comparing Canada and the U.S. is informative, as these two 
systems display the contrasts of differing types of banking systems. 
Next we examine some of the costs of banking panics that contemporary observers of panics 
highlighted.  The costs concern disruptions of the transactions system during banking panics.  It 
appears that during panics, when the value of bank liabilities comes into question, they stop 
functioning as a circulating medium.  This evidence is reviewed as a prelude to our main 
theoretical argument, concerning why the government assumed the role of lender-of-last-resort, 
supplanting private bank coalitions. 
The theoretical argument we propose begins from the point where Gorton and Huang (2001) 
leave off.  In particular, Gorton and Huang (2001) do not explain why the government needs to 
take over the role of the private bank coalitions of clearinghouses.  Indeed, they suggest that it is 
not obvious how the government can improve upon the private arrangements, lending credence to 




government introduced central banks.  In this paper, we extend the Gorton and Huang’s (2001) 
model to include a role for consumers using bank liabilities as a medium of exchange.  This 
seems like a natural extension since bank liabilities do indeed serve this role.  We show that, 
while panics can serve the role of disciplining banks by forcing coalitions to behave incentive-
compatibly, panics disrupt the use of bank liabilities as a medium of exchange.  This is costly.  
Since, according to this argument, a panic itself is costly, the government may improve welfare if 
panics can be avoided.  But, panics are not just irrational runs on banks; they serve an economic 
function.  So, if the government eliminates panics, with deposit insurance, then the government 
must take over the function of monitoring banks.  The government may not be as effective at 
monitoring as the private coalitions, resulting in a cost.  Whether the government central bank is 
superior to the private arrangements depends on this trade-off. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II we briefly review some of the historical and cross-
country evidence on the performance of banking systems and the history of panics.  The goal of 
this review is to provide a context that a model should take into account.  In particular, we 
summarize the experience of banking systems historically and internationally.  In Section III we 
review Gorton and Huang’s (2001) model and basic results.  In Section IV we extend the model 
to include a role for consumers/depositors to use bank liabilities (bank notes or demand deposits) 
as a circulating medium of exchange.  We then introduce a government central banking scheme 
and analyze the welfare implications of the government’s scheme in contrast to the private bank 
coalition system.  We provide conditions under which welfare improves under the government’s 
scheme.  Section V concludes. 
 
II.  Panics and the Industrial Organization of Banking: The Historical and Cross 
Country Evidence 
 
In this section we briefly summarize research on banking history, in particular on the incidence 
and timing of banking panics in different countries, specifically in relation to the industrial 
organization of the banking industry.  Then we compare the experiences of Canada to the U.S. to 
emphasize the differences.  We briefly review the workings of bank coalitions, focusing on the 
American clearinghouse system.  And finally, we discuss the question of disruption of the 





To begin, we need a definition of a “banking panic.”  Calomiris and Gorton (1991) define a panic 
as an event in which bank debt holders (depositors) at many or even all banks in the banking 
system suddenly demand that their banks convert their debt claims into cash (at par) to such an 
extent that banks cannot jointly honor these demands and suspend convertibility.  Note that this 
definition excludes events in which a single bank faces a run; a panic is a system-wide 
phenomenon.  Also, cases where depositors seek to withdraw large amounts from the banking 
system, but banks can honor these withdrawals are not “panics,” although the banking system 
may shrink significantly.  Finally, note that the definition is specific enough to differentiate the 
event of interest from other events with nebulous names like “financial crisis” or “contagion” and 
so on.  For a discussion of “bank panic” definitions in the literature, see Gorton and Winton 
(2001). 
 
Using the above definition, Calomiris and Gorton (1991) identify six panics in the United States 
prior to 1865, seven during the National Banking Era, and finally the panics during the Great 
Depression.  In each case the phenomenon of interest is complicated, appears to have special 
circumstances, and seems to vary in important respects from other episodes, making any 
definition and inferences problematic.  In fact, there are few observations of panics in any 
country, making hypothesis testing difficult.  Nevertheless, some important empirical regularities 
have been found.   
 
A.  Some Empirical Regularities about Panics 
 
Banking panics are more likely to occur in certain types of banking systems and at certain stages 
of the business cycle.  Since the U.S. economy has the most experience with panics, for reasons 
that we discuss below, most of the research has focused on the U.S.  The banking panic 
regularities are documented in a fairly large literature on the historical and international 
experience of banking panics, and we only briefly review it here.  Bordo (1985, 1986), Calomiris 
and Gorton (1991), Calomiris (1993), and Gorton and Winton (2001) survey much of the 
literature and also provide some new evidence on the causes of panics.  Andrew (1908a, 1908b), 
Sprague (1910), Wicker (1980, 1996, 2000), Donaldson (1993), Moen and Tallis (1992, 2000), 
Calomiris and Schweikart (1991), McGrane (1924), and White (1984), among many others, study 





The most important empirical regularity is that the industrial organization of the banking industry 
is a critical determinant of the propensity for an economy to experience panics.   As summarized 
by Calomiris (1993): “International comparisons of the incidence and costs of banking panics and 
bank failures, and comparisons across regulatory regimes within the U.S., clearly document 
differences in banking instability associated with different regulatory regimes.  The central lesson 
of these studies is that instability is associated with some historical examples of banking that had 
common institutional characteristics; it is not an intrinsic problem with banking per se ... the 
single most important factor in banking instability has been the organization of the banking 
industry” (p. 21).  Basically, banking panics are much less likely to occur in banking systems in 
which there are a few relatively large, well-branched, and well-diversified banks.  Bordo (1986) 
studies the experiences of six countries (U.S., U.K., Canada, Sweden, Germany, and France) over 
the period 1870 to 1933.  One of Bordo’s conclusions is that most severe cyclical contractions in 
all the countries are associated with stock market crises, but not with banking panics, except for 
the United States.  He notes that: “In contrast with the U.S. experience, the five other countries in 
the same period developed nationwide branch banking systems consolidating into a very few 
large banks” (p. 230).  Bordo (1985) surveys banking and securities market panics in six 
countries from 1870 to 1933 and concludes: “the United States experienced panics in a period 
when they were a historical curiosity in other countries” (p. 73).  Grossman (1994) examines the 
experience of Britain, Canada, and ten other countries during the Great Depression to determine 
the causes of the “exceptional stability” exhibited by their banking systems.  He considers three 
possible explanations: the structure of the banking system, macroeconomic policy and 
performance, and the behavior of the lender-of-last-resort.  He concludes that banking stability is 
the product of exchange-rate policy and banking structure. 
 
Cross section variation within the United States is also interesting because some states allowed 
branch banking while other states did not.  States that allowed branching experienced lower 
failure rates in the 1920s and it was the smaller banks that were more prone to failure (see Bremer 
(1935) and White (1983, 1984)).  Studying this cross section of state experiences, Calomiris 
(1990) reaches the same conclusion about the importance of branching: “States that allowed 
branch banking saw much lower failure rates- reflecting the unusually high survivability of 
branching banks… From 1921 to 1929 only 37 branching banks failed in the United States, 
almost all of which operated only one or two branches.  Branching failures were only 4 percent of 
branch-banking facilities, almost an order of magnitude less than the failure rate of unit banks for 





A second apparent regularity concerning banking panics is that there is an important business 
cycle and, possibly, seasonal component to the timing of panics.  Panics come at or near business 
cycle peaks.  The interpretation is not that panics caused downturns.  There is not enough data to 
analyze that issue.  Rather, the idea is that depositors received information forecasting a recession 
and withdrew in an anticipation of the recession, a time when bank failures were more likely.  See 
Bordo (1986), Gorton (1988), Calomiris and Gorton (1991), and Donaldson (1992).  While the 
relation of panics to the business cycle will be incorporated into the model below, the “regularity” 
is somewhat fragile as there are few observations of panics.  Some have argued that there is also a 
seasonal factor in panics.  The seasonal factor in the timing of panics is noted by Andrew (1907), 
Kemmerer (1910), Miron (1986), Donaldson (1992), and Calomiris and Gorton (1991), among 
others.  But, Wicker (2000), for example, disputes the evidence.  The seasonal factor seems less 
clear than the business cycle component. 
 
B.  The Canadian and U.S. Banking Experiences 
A comparison of the U.S. and Canadian banking experiences from the middle of the 19
th century 
is an instructive example of the importance of industrial organization in banking and it’s relation 
to central banking.  This comparison is interesting because Canada is a system that historically 
has consisted of a small number of highly branched banks, in contrast to the American system of 
many banks that were not, until recently, branched across state lines, and sometimes not even 
within the state.  Canada’s central bank came into existence in 1935 and deposit insurance was 
adopted in the late 1960s.  The differences between the two systems are striking and have often 
been commented upon (see the citations below). 
The United States set up the National Banking system in 1863-64; fairly high capital 
requirements were imposed on federally chartered banks; there was a bond backing system for 
note issuance, reserve requirements, and other requirements, including in particular the 
prohibition of branch banking across state lines.  Canada followed a very different set of banking 
policies, allowing branch banking, and imposing relatively fewer restrictions.  The different 
national regulations led to very different banking systems.  During the period 1870 to 1913, 
Canada had a branch banking system with about forty chartered banks, each extensively 
branched.  In 1890 the United States had more than eight thousand independent unit banks.  See 




Haubrich (1990), Bordo, Rockoff, and Redish (1994, 1995), and White (1984), among others, 
study the different experiences of the two systems.  In particular, there were high failure rates in 
the U.S. and low failure rates in Canada.  Thirteen Canadian banks failed from 1868 to 1889.  
Depositors lost very little in these cases (zero in eight of the cases) (see Vreeland, et. al., (1910), 
p. 219).  During the same period, there were hundreds of failures in the U.S. (see the Comptroller 
of the Currency (1920)).  In contrast to the U.S., there were no panics in Canada.  Bordo, 
Rockoff, and Redish (1994) summarize the contrast in the experiences of the two systems: “There 
is an immediate and important difference between the Canadian and United States banking 
systems.  The Canadian experience has been one of considerable stability.  There has been only 
one major bank failure since World War I, and there were no failures during the Great 
Depression.  In contrast, the American system has been characterized by a number of periods of 
instability.  Rates of bank failures were high in the 1920s, and of course the entire system 
collapsed during the 1930s” (p. 325). 
The comparative experience of the Great Depression shows that while there were few bank 
failures in Canada, the Canadian banking system did shrink.  According to White (1984): “In 
Canada, from 1920 to 1929, only one bank failed.  The contraction of the banking industry was 
carried out by the remaining banks reducing the number of their offices by 13.2 percent. This was 
very near the 9.8 percent decline in the United States…In spite of the many similarities with the 
United States, there were no bank failures in Canada during the years 1929-1933.  The number of 
bank offices fell by another 10.4 percent, reflecting the shocked state of the economy; yet this 
was far fewer than the 34.5 percent of all bank offices permanently closed in the United States” 
(p. 132).  The Canadian banking system survived the Great Depression with few effects, while in 
the U.S., which had enacted the Federal Reserve Act in 1914, the banking system collapsed.  
Canada’s central bank came into being in 1935, well after the Great Depression.  Furthermore, 
Bordo and Redish (1987) argue that the introduction of the Central Bank of Canada was for 
political rather than economic reasons. 
 
C.  Bank Coalitions in the U.S. and Other Countries 
Until the last few years, there have been a very large number of rather small, undiversified banks 
in the U.S.  The U.S. also stands out as an outlier in the frequency of banking panics during its 
history.  The research cited above strongly suggests that these two facts are linked.  There is 




the private clearinghouse system.  Clearinghouses are private associations of banks that formed in 
major cities, spreading out across the country during the 19
th century.  Originally having roots in 
the payments system, these organizations developed into important institutions for monitoring 
banks and creating liquidity in times of banking panics.  We briefly describe the functioning of 
these U.S. clearinghouses and then briefly mention other bank coalitions in other countries and 
contexts.  On the U.S. clearinghouse system see Andrew (1908b), Cannon (1910), Gorton (1984, 
1985), Gorton and Mullineaux (1987), Timberlake (1984), Sprague (1910), Moen and Tallman 
(2000), and Wicker (2000), among others. 
The U.S. clearinghouse system developed over the course of the 19
th century.  For purposes here 
the main point concerns the method that clearinghouses developed to turn illiquid loan portfolios 
into money, private money that could be handed out to depositors in exchange for their demand 
deposits during times of panic.  Clearinghouse loan certificates originated in the interbank 
clearing system as a way to economize on cash during a panic.  During a banking panic member 
banks were allowed to apply to a clearinghouse committee, submitting assets as collateral in 
exchange for certificates.  If the committee approved the submitted assets, offered in exchange, 
then certificates would be issued only up to a percentage of the face value of the assets.  The bank 
borrowing against its illiquid assets would have to pay interest on the certificates to the 
clearinghouse. The certificates could then be used to honor interbank obligations where they 
replaced cash, which instead could be used to pay out to depositors. 
The clearinghouse loan certificate process is the origin of the discount window (and is described 
in detail in the above cited sources), and serves the same function.  One difference, however, is 
that under the private clearinghouse system a member bank’s application for loan certificates was 
secret.  The identity of a weak member bank was not revealed.  Notably, the loan certificates were 
the joint obligations of the clearinghouse member banks; the risk of member banks defaulting was 
shared by allocating member liabilities in proportion to member bank capital.  Thus, the 
certificates were a risk-sharing device, where the members jointly assumed the risk that 
individual member banks would fail. 
During the Panics of 1873, 1893, and 1907 the clearinghouse loan certificate process was 
extended, in increasingly sophisticated ways, in a radical innovation.  In particular, the 
clearinghouse loan certificates were issued directly to bank depositors, in exchange for demand 
deposits, in denominations corresponding to currency.  The amount of private money issued 




clearinghouse hand-to-hand money was issued (2.5 percent of the money stock).  During the 
Panic of 1907, about $500 million was issued (4.5 percent of the money stock).  See Gorton 
(1985).  If the depositors would accept the certificates as money, then the banks’ illiquid loan 
portfolios would be directly monetized.  As under the interbank arrangement of loan certificates, 
the certificates issued directly to the public were the joint liability of the clearinghouse, not the 
individual bank.  In this way, a depositor who was fearful that his particular bank might fail was 
able to insure against this event by trading his claim on the individual bank for a claim on the 
portfolio of banks in the clearinghouse.  This was the origin of deposit insurance. 
The clearinghouses in the U.S. also developed bank examination and supervision methods, as 
well as reporting systems for information to be made public on a regular basis.  (As previously 
mentioned, the revelation of information about individual banks was suspended during banking 
panics.)  
The U.S. clearinghouse system was not the only private central bank-like institution.  Before the 
U.S. Civil War, coincident with the beginnings of the clearinghouse system, the Suffolk Bank of 
Massachusetts was the focal point of a clearing system and acted as a lender-of-last-resort during 
the Panic of 1837.  See Mullineaux (1987), Calomiris and Kahn (1996), Rolnick, Smith, and 
Weber (1998a, 1998b), and Whitney (1878). 
Bank coalitions are also not unique to the United States.  See Cannon (1908, 1910) for 
information on the clearinghouses of England, Canada, and Japan.  While most countries did not 
experience banking panics as frequently as the U.S., there are many examples of bank coalitions 
forming on occasion in other countries as well.  We mention a few examples.  The Clearing 
House of Montreal was maintained by the Canadian Bankers’ Association and, according to 
Watts (1972), was officially recognized in 1901 ‘as an agency for the supervision and control of 
certain activities of the banks’  (p. 18).   According to Bordo and Redish (1987)  “the Bank of 
Montreal (founded in 1817) emerged very early as the government’s bank performing many 
central bank functions.  However, the Bank of Montreal never evolved into a full-fledged central 
bank as did the Bank of England (or the government’s bank in other countries) perhaps because 
of the rivalry of other large Canadian banks (for example the Royal Bank).”  See Watts (1972), 
Haubrich (1990), and Breckenridge (1910). 
The pattern of the Bank of Montreal (and earlier precursors like the Suffolk Bank in the U.S.) in 
which the bank coalition is centered on one large bank, is quite common.  Another common 




rescue a bank in trouble or stem a panic.  For example, major Canadian banks joined with the 
Canadian government to attempt a rescue of the Canadian Commercial Bank in March 1985.  See 
Jayanti, Whyte, and Do (1993).  Similarly, in Germany the Bankhaus Herstatt was closed on June 
26, 1974.  There was no statutory deposit insurance scheme in Germany, but the West German 
Federal Association of banks used $7.8 million in insurance to cover the losses. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, Germany is a particularly interesting case because it is a 
developed capitalist country where deposit insurance is completely private, being provided by 
coalitions of private banks (there is a coalition for each of the three types of banking institutions) 
following the Herstatt crisis of 1974 (see Beck (no date)).  It is not compulsory and there is no 
public supervision.  Germany is interesting in being so late in developing even a formal private 
coalition.  But, the German banking system is one dominated by a few very large banks.  Gorton 
and Huang (2001) label such systems Big Bank Systems and argue that such systems have a 
much lower incidence of panic and hence not much need for bank coalitions.  In subsequent 
failures, the coalition of German banks worked in concert with public officials to resolve the 
situations (see Beck (no date)).   
To summarize, private coalitions of banks have historically been important in functioning as 
lender-of-last-resort and in providing deposit insurance.  Even today, private coalitions perform 
this function in many countries. 
D.  The “Currency Famine” During Panics 
Banking panics may be costly because they disrupt the economy’s transaction technology, which 
is based in large part on conducting trade with bank notes and bank deposits.  Because agents in 
the economy doubt the value of bank circulating liabilities during panics, and because banks 
suspend convertibility, trade can no longer be conducted with bank liabilities, but only with 
currency.  As a result of this, scared agents begin to hoard currency, refusing to deposit it into 
banks.  This causes currency to go a premium.  Companies cannot meet payrolls or conduct 
business; money substitutes begin to develop.  The disruption of the transactions system has been 
described as a “currency famine.”  This description of a panic has not been formally studied by 
modern researchers, but corresponds to the observations of contemporary observers and early 20
th 
century researchers.  We briefly provide more detail. 
Sprague (1910) describes the aftermath of a panic in this way: “A far more serious cause of 




making payments at a distance local substitutes for money will not serve.  When the banks in one 
locality refuse to remit to banks elsewhere upon drafts and checks sent to them for payment 
business must soon come to a standstill” (p. 75).  When bank liabilities are no longer acceptable 
as transactions media, agents in the economy start to hoard cash.  Again, Sprague (1910) writes:  
“Uncertain whether the banks would provide the money they might shortly need, many persons 
began to discontinue paying into the banks cash received in the course of daily business” 
(Sprague, p. 68).  Instead, people hoard currency.  See Sprague (1910), Andrew (1908a, b), and 
Noyes (1909). 
Such hoarding of currency had two effects.  First, businesses cannot meet payrolls because there 
is not enough currency (see, e.g., Sprague (1910), p. 71).  Sprague (p. 202) quotes the 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, September 16, 1893: 
The month of August will remain memorable as one of the most remarkable in our 
industrial history.  Never before has there been such a sudden and striking cessation of 
industrial activity.  Nor was any section of the country exempt from the paralysis; mills, 
factories, furnaces, mines nearly everywhere shut down in large numbers, and commerce 
and enterprise were arrested in an extraordinary and unprecedented degree.  The 
complete unsettlement of confidence and the derangement of our financial machinery, 
which made it impossible to obtain loans or sell domestic exchange and which put money 
to a premium over checks, had the effect of stopping the wheels of industry and of 
contracting production and consumption within the narrowest of limits, so that our 
internal trade was reduced to very small proportions  -- in fact, was brought almost to a 
standstill – and hundreds and thousands of men thrown out of employment.  (p. 446 of 
the Chronicle). 
Second, currency goes to a premium, which causes money substitutes to arise.  See Sprague 
(1910), Andrew (1908a, b), and Noyes (1909).  Andrew (1907a) and Sprague (1910) record the 
currency premia during various panics.  During the Panic of 1907 the premium was as high as 4 
percent.  Again, Sprague writes:  “While it is possible, though not probable, that the currency 
premium increased the domestic money supply, it is certain that it vastly increased the amount of 
money required for a given volume of transactions.  Evidence for this conclusion is found in the 
apparent dearth of money which followed immediately the announcement that banks restricted 
payments” (p. 195-6).  Andrew (1907b) describes and estimates the volume of substitutes for cash 
that arose during the Panic of 1907. 
While the clearinghouse system developed over the course of the 19
th century, clearinghouse 
money issued during panics was not sufficient to eliminate the hoarding of cash and the 
consequent currency premia.  The shock of the panic to the transactions system was sudden and 




prior to suspension of convertibility the money supply would drop, via the money multiplier.  
Then, the outstanding bank liabilities would no longer be acceptable.  The extent of the 
consequent real effects on production and output has not been formally studied. 
 
III. The  Model 
The evidence in Section II suggests that banking systems are not inherently unstable and that 
panics are related to the industrial organization of the banking system.  Gorton and Huang (2001) 
present a model consistent with this evidence.  In this section we review the details of their model 
and summarize their results, as a prelude to extending their analysis.  There are two core 
assumptions in the model.  First, there is asymmetric information: banks are better informed than 
their depositors.  Second, banks may engage in moral hazard if their equity falls below a critical 
value.  These are fairly standard assumptions.  Not surprisingly these assumptions lead depositors 
to sometimes want to withdraw their bank deposits.  Withdrawals may be inefficient because the 
bank may, in fact, be quite well off, but depositors do not know this. 
A.  The Gorton and Huang (2001) Model 
The model economy has three dates, 0, 1, and 2, and two types of agents: consumers/depositors 
and bankers.   
Bankers are unique in having the ability to locate risky investment opportunities.  Also, only 
banks can store endowments (i.e., provide the service of safekeeping).  There is a continuum of 
bankers.  Each banker has capital β  and a measure one of potential depositors.  Each bank has 
access to a riskless storage technology and to a risky investment technology.  The fraction of the 
portfolio invested in the riskless storage technology is α , subsequently referred to as “reserves.”  
Investments in the risky projects have to be made at date 0, and the returns are realized at date 2.  
The date 2 return to a risky project depends on the state of the economy, which is a random 
variable, realized at date 1.  The return to a unit (of endowment good) invested in the risk project 
is r ~ ~ + π , that is, there is a systematic component,π~, and an idiosyncratic component, r ~ , to the 
return.  π~  is uniformly distributed in the interval [π L, π H].  For future reference, the probability 









a risky project,  r ~ , is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 2Μ ].    For future reference, the 






At date 1, information about the date 2 return is realized, but there is asymmetric information 
between bankers and depositors.  Depositors observe the realized state of the macroeconomy (π ), 
but they do not observe the realized state of their bank’s idiosyncratic return, r.  In addition to 
observing the macroeconomic state, each banker knows his own bank’s state, r, and observes the 
realizations of other banks’ idiosyncratic shocks at date 1.  Idiosyncratic shock realizations at date 
1 are not verifiable among banks, but realized cash flows at date 2 are verifiable.  So, banks 
cannot write contracts with other banks contingent on idiosyncratic shocks at date 1.  At date 0, 
we assume that the banks’ choice of reserve level α , and the level of bank capital β , are 
observable and verifiable.   
There is a moral hazard problem in that bankers have an opportunity to engage in fraud at date 1.  
Fraud is socially wasteful.  If a banker engages in fraud, he gets a proportion f of the return (i.e. 
f(π +r)), where f is between 0 and 1. The remaining amount, (1− f)(π +r), is wasted and depositors 
receive nothing.  Projects can be liquidated at date 1, yielding a constant return of Q, regardless of 
the state of the project.  A risky project is indivisible when liquidation occurs. Although at date 0, 
a banker can choose how much to invest in a risky project, at date 1 all the assets in a risky 
project must be liquidated if liquidation occurs. 
Each depositor/consumer is endowed with one (indivisible) unit of perishable endowment good at 
date 0.  At date 0 each depositor can choose to consume or deposit in the bank.  If they deposit in 
the bank, they can choose to withdraw at date 1 or date 2 (see the discussion in Gorton and Huang 
(2001) concerning the optimality of the deposit contract).  Depositors have a subsistence level of 
1. Their utility function is:  
 
 
where ci is consumption at date i.  Depositors will consumer everything at a single date and will 
prefer to consumer later if they can consume the same amount of consumption goods. 
Depositors' utility function implies that they will withdraw at date 1 if they anticipate that there is 
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than one unit back if their banker engages in fraud, as explained below.  Depositors deposit in a 
single bank.   
Finally, bankers are risk neutral and they get the entire surplus from investment. The promised 
payment to depositors is equal to one, no matter when (at date 1 or date 2) depositors withdraw.   
To make the problem interesting, Gorton and Huang (2001) assume that: 
Assumption 1. (1+β )(1− f)(π L+M) < 1.  This assumption assures that there is a potential moral 
hazard problem.  Suppose the economy turns out to be in the worst possible state (π L) at date 1.  If 
a banker with the mean return π L+M engages in fraud, he will receive f(1+β )(π L+M).  If he does 
not engage in fraud, his payoff will be (1+β )(π L+M)− 1.  The assumption that (1+β )(1− f)(π L+M) < 
1 ensures that the banker has an incentive to engage in fraud.    
Assumption 2. π L > Q > f(π H+2M).   In words, there is a dead weight loss if liquidation or fraud 
occurs.   
Assumption 3.  Q 1 M
2
H L > > +
π + π
.  In words, a risky project is more efficient ex ante than 
riskless storage, if there is no liquidation or fraud.  However, if liquidation or fraud happens, then 
a risky project is dominated by investment in riskless storage.  
Assumption 4.  (1+β )Q > 1.  That is, if depositors withdraw from their bank at date 1, then their 
deposit contract can always be honored.  
Depositors are rational in anticipating that their banker may have an incentive to engage in moral 
hazard in certain states of the world.  If depositors anticipate that the banker is going to engage in 
fraud, they withdraw their deposits to prevent it.  This corresponds to monitoring.  Bankers can 
commit to not engage in moral hazard by holding reserves. The higher the level of reserves, the 
lower the probability that a bank run occurs.  However, ex post, if the state of the economy is in a 
“good” state at date 1, then it would have been better to have invested in risky projects.  The 
bankers' task at date 0 is to choose an optimal reserve level, α  (the fraction of bank assets held in 
the riskless storage technology).  This is the only choice variable.   
Banks provide a way to transfer wealth from period to period since they are unique in being able 
to identify risky investment opportunities; consumers/depositors cannot find these opportunities.  




requirement of consumers.  Because of their utility functions, consumers need to be assured that 
their claim will be worth 1 unit and banks can satisfy this need.  Implicitly, individual banks can 
diversify to this extent.  The utility function is a reduced form for a consumer demand for a 
riskless trading claim (see Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)).  The structure of preferences dictates 
the type of claim that banks will offer depositors: the bank must offer the right to withdraw 
deposits at face value at date 1, i.e., a demand deposit contract.  This is for simplicity. 
 
B.  Summary of the Results on Different Types of Banking Systems  
Gorton and Huang analyze three types of banking systems.  The first is a system of independent 
unit banks.  These are undiversified.  The second is a system of a few large, diversified banks.  
The system of small independent Unit Banks, and that of Big Banks, as they are labeled, are 
essentially benchmark systems for comparison with the third system, which is one where the 
banks form a coalition. 
In the system of independent, Unit Banks, the banks are small in the sense that a banker in charge 
of a Unit Bank can only manage one risky project.  Such a banker cannot diversify the risk by 
dividing his asset portfolio into many risky projects.  In the Unit Banking system, at date 1, 
depositors observe the state of the macroeconomy, π , and can calculate whether, given that state, 
there is a chance that their banker will engage in moral hazard.  Because their utility functions are 
kinked and they will get minus infinity if consumption is less than one, depositors do not care 
about the likelihood of moral hazard occurring, but rather whether there is any chance of moral 
hazard occurring.  If depositors find that there is a chance that bankers will engage in fraud (i.e. 





), then they withdraw all their savings.
1  Since all the depositors receive the 
same macroeconomic information and all the banks are, from their viewpoint, homogeneous, if 
one bank suffers from a run, there are runs on all the other banks.  Therefore, a panic occurs.  In 
terms of the model, a banking panic is a date 1 event in which depositors at all banks seek to 
withdraw their deposits, and all banks are liquidated. 
At date 0, anticipating what will happen in different states of the world at date 1, bankers choose 
the optimal reserve level to maximize their expected payoff.  On the one hand, bankers want to 
maximize investment in the risky projects because this is more profitable, but on the other hand, 




level is greater than or equal to 
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≡ α , banks have no incentive to engage in fraud 
even if the macroeconomy is in its lowest state π L.  There is a unique optimal level of reserves in 
the interval  ] , 0 [ α that solves a Unit Bank’s date 0 profit maximization problem. 
The “Big Bank” system is a different form of industrial organization.  A Big Bank is a bank with 
a portfolio of assets that has a realized return of π  + M at date 1.  In other words, its return is the 
systematic return plus the diversified idiosyncratic mean return, M.  This is the essential point, 
namely, that the idiosyncratic risk is diversified away, implicitly by virtue of the bank’s size via 
branching.  Consequently, at date 1, when the state of the economy is revealed, the return to a Big 
Bank's risky projects is also known. The state of macroeconomy is sufficient information for 
assessing the state of a Big Bank.  As a result, depositors know for sure whether a Big Bank is 
going to engage in moral hazard or not.  If they anticipate that their Big Bank will engage in 
fraud, they run on the Big Bank.  Otherwise they wait until date 2 to withdraw. 
Besides the fact that there is no information asymmetry with Big Banks, there is another very 
important difference.   Big Banks have the flexibility to partially liquidate their portfolios at date 
1.  In fact, a Big Bank only needs to liquidate some of the risky projects when a bank run occurs.  
It is assumed that liquidation (and fraud) can occur at the project level.  In order to deal with 
depositors’ withdrawals at date 1, a Big Bank only needs to liquidate a fraction x of the risky 
projects such that α  +(1+β−α) xQ is equal to 1.  Actually, however, a Big Bank can do even better 
if it can commit to not engage in fraud by liquidating some of the projects and holding the 
proceeds as additional reserves.  Although the risky projects have idiosyncratic returns, for 
simplicity we assume that they have the same liquidation value Q.   
Suppose the Big Bank is to liquidate a fraction x of the risky projects.  It should liquidate 
optimally, as follows.  It will liquidate those projects that have realized idiosyncratic returns, r, in 
the interval  [0, x2M].  The remaining (1-x) fraction of projects has realized idiosyncratic returns 
r in the complementary interval: [x2M, 2M].  The average return on the remaining, i.e., 
nonliquidated, (1-x) fraction of projects is  M ) x 1 (
2
M 2 M 2 x
+ + π =
+
+ π .  If the Big Bank allows 
the remaining projects to continue without engaging in fraud, its payoff is α +(1+β−α) xQ+ 
(1+β−α) (1-x)(π+(1+ x)Μ) -1.  If the Big Bank engages in fraud on the remaining projects, its 
payoff will be f(1+β−α) (1-x)(π+(1+ x)Μ).   Therefore, to convince depositors that moral hazard 




+(1+β−α) xQ+(1+β−α) (1-x)( π+(1+ x)Μ) -1  ≥  f(1+β−α) (1-x)(π+(1+ x)Μ).   The optimal x is the 
solution to the following problem: 
Max x α  +(1+β−α) xQ + (1+β−α) (1-x)(π+(1+ x)Μ) -1 
            s.t. (1+β−α) (1-x)( π+(1+ x)Μ)  -1 ≥  f(1+β−α) (1-x)( π+(1+ x)Μ)  
             x ∈ [0,1]. 
Gorton and Huang solve this problem and provide the unique optimal fraction to liquidate at date 
1.  Then the date 0 problem is solved for choice of reserve level.  For purposes here, note that in 
the Big Bank system, banks may experience withdrawals at date 1, but they do not fail, i.e., they 
are not liquidated.  In the model there is no difference between the bank liquidating projects and 
holding the proceeds as reserves and withdrawals.  In other words, the Big Bank system can be 
viewed as experiencing deposit withdrawals, but there are no bank runs or failures. The Big Bank 
system does not experience banking panics.  The independent unit banks have bank runs, and 
failures, because each unit bank’s project is indivisible when liquidation occurs. 
In broad outlines, the distinction between the Big Bank system and the system of small 
independent Unit Banks corresponds to the difference between the Canadian and U.S. banking 
systems.  As mentioned above, the Canadian system displayed fewer failures and no panics.   
C.  The Setting With Bank Coalitions 
Finally, there is the case of bank coalitions.  The basic idea for the coalition is as follows.   
Suppose that there are small independent Unit Banks at date 0.  These small Unit Banks can 
decide to form a coalition at date 0 and the coalition can partially replicate the Big Bank in certain 
states of the world at date 1.  The coalition is defined by rules concerning date 0 reserve and 
capital levels, as well as rules indicating that, if there is a panic at date 1, then some banks are to 
be liquidated and the remaining banks must follow a prespecified sharing rule.  (The details are in 
Gorton and Huang (2001).) At date 0, Unit Banks can get together to form a coalition and reach 
an agreement about their individual capital and reserve levels.  Because the idiosyncratic shocks 
are not verifiable, and thus not contractible, the coalition has no power to force its members to 
comply with the rules and the member banks are free to quit at any time they want.  The only 
requirement to become a member of the coalition at date 0 is to hold the required reserve level 




carried out or not.  They can only observe whether the coalition liquidates some of the member 
banks and combines the assets and liabilities of the remaining member banks.   
The operation of the coalition means to achieve two goals. First, by liquidating some of the 
member banks the coalition tries to inform depositors that the non-liquidated banks are in 
relatively more sound states. This partially alleviates the panic caused by the asymmetric 
information between the banks and depositors. Second, by pooling the liabilities the coalition 
tries to convince depositors that incentives to engage in fraud can be removed by monitoring and 
coinsurance among the remaining banks. 
Gorton and Huang (2001) show that if there is no panic at date 1 then no bank coalition will 
operate.  Banks will behave as Unit Banks.  Because the rules of the coalition, adopted at date 0, 
are not binding, banks are free to deviate from those rules.  They can, in principle, adopt any set 
of rules concerning transfers among members (as long as such rules satisfy the budget constraint 
for the coalition).  Without a panic, banks will always deviate from the proposed coalition rules.  
The banking panic creates an externality for banks that would not engage in the moral hazard 
problem, the “good” banks.  If these good banks did not face the panic, they would have no 
incentive to monitor the banks that are going to engage in fraud, the “bad” banks.  Because 
depositors cannot distinguish good banks from bad banks, all banks face the prospect of being 
liquidated.  This creates the incentive for good banks to monitor bad banks. 
Depositors anticipate that if they do not run on the banks, the coalition will not do anything to 
prevent member banks from engaging in fraud. So, they run all banks if and only if 






2  Once the depositors run the banks, the coalition has to operate to convince 
the depositors that it can remove the incentives to engage in fraud from some of its member banks 
and therefore there is no need to liquidate those banks. 
Gorton and Huang prove the existence of a coalition equilibrium (see their definition).   In this 
equilibrium, banks with idiosyncratic shocks r∈  [0, x*(α, π )2M] are liquidated and these bankers 
are paid α +(1+β -α )Q-1, their outside option value of deviating from the coalition.  The cut-off 
point x*(α ,π ) is given by:  }} 1
- f M
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3  No member 
bank quits the coalition and no bank engages in fraud.  For banks that are not liquidated there is a 




The coalition behaves as a lender-of-last-resort by monitoring and by providing insurance.   
Monitoring corresponds to liquidating bad banks, those with the worst idiosyncratic shock 
realizations.  Member banks of type r∈  [0, x*(α, π )2M] are liquidated.  These banks would have 
engaged in fraud.  The insurance comes from the transfers implemented among the non-liquidated 
banks.  Member banks of type r∈ [x*(α,π )2M, 2M] are not liquidated, but are assigned new debt 
obligations.  Their original debt, i.e., face value of the demand deposits, was one.  Banks with 
π −
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<
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r  have their debt reduced, so these banks are subsidized to entice them not 
to engage in fraud.  This is efficient because their projects are worth more if they are continued, 
as long as they do not engage in fraud.  Member banks with  π −
α − β + −
α −
>
) 1 )( f 1 (
1
r  have their 
debt increased, so these banks are being taxed to pay the subsidy to the low r banks.  Banks with 
high idiosyncratic shock realizations cannot be taxed too much, or they will engage in fraud.  The 
transfers of the debt obligations must satisfy a budget constraint. The budget constraint limits 
how much insurance the coalition can provide and, therefore, determines the point at which 
member banks are liquidated. 
At date 0, each bank must decide whether to join the coalition and the coalition must determine 
the optimal reserve level α.    For comparison purposes later, the optimal reserve for the coalition 
is the solution of the following problem: 
Maxα ∫ + − + + − − + + − + +
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The coalition system is an intermediate case between the Unit Bank system and the Big Bank 




that we may observe bank failures (i.e., liquidations) when the economy is in a bad state.  The 
similarity between the coalition system and the Big Bank system is that the coalition can monitor 
and insure member banks when the economy is in a bad state, while the Big Bank “monitors” 
itself by closing branches. The one unique feature associated with the coalition is that when a 
panic occurs, it suspends convertibility and issues certificates. This feature is important because it 
is a commitment made to depositors that the non-liquidated member banks will not engage in 
fraud and it provides incentives for member banks to monitor and insure each other.  
D.  Summary 
With respect to efficiency, Gorton and Huang show that the Big Bank system is more efficient 
than the coalition system, which is more efficient than the independent Unit Banking system.  
Realistically, no economy is likely to exactly correspond to the Big Bank system, though some 
countries, e.g., Canada and Germany, may come close.  Almost all economies may be expected to 
have some form of coalition with the degree of formality being related to the incidence of panics. 
A key remaining issue concerns why private coalitions were replaced by the government in the 
form of deposit insurance and government banks acting as lender-of-last-resort.  Gorton and 
Huang (2001) do not explain why government central banks replaced private bank coalitions.  In 
fact, in their model, there is no obvious rationale for the government to step in and provide the 
lender-of-last-resort function unless the government has much more power than private agents, 
more resources than private agents, or there are costs to panics that have not been considered.  
They consider each of these possibilities in turn and conclude that the first two possibilities are 
unrealistic.  
For example, if the government can simply intervene at date 1 and prevent fraud, then the 
government can improve welfare, compared to any of the private arrangements.  But, this seems 
unrealistic.  Nor is it realistic to assume to that the government can make transfers at date 2 
contingent on the banks’ idiosyncratic shock realizations.  Governments are likely to be less 
informed than the banks themselves. 
 
IV.  Government Central Banks vs. Private Bank Coalitions 
An important role of banks is to provide a transaction medium.  This role was not considered in 




liabilities.  This is a natural extension, as bank liabilities do in fact function as a medium of 
exchange.   We then analyze what happens to the transaction capabilities of bank money when 
there is a banking panic.  We show that the transactions system based on bank money is disrupted 
in a costly way when there is a panic.  Moreover, the problem we identify appears to be similar to 
that discussed by contemporary observers of panics, cited above.  In particular, during panics the 
problem is the sudden disappearance to bank liabilities as an acceptable form of exchange.  There 
is a “currency famine.” 
The incentive compatible functioning of the coalition requires the existence of panics.  But, the 
bank coalition does not take the disruption of the transactions medium into account; it does not 
internalize this cost.  Consequently, we are led to examine a role for government intervention in 
banking, specifically to replace the private bank coalitions.  We consider two possible 
government policies.  First, the government can set a level of required reserves that takes the 
costs of panic into account.  Panics will still happen, but they will be less frequent than under the 
private system.  With panics still occurring, the coalition will still function.  A better system 
might be to eliminate panics all together.  Thus, the second policy is one of deposit insurance.  
Under this system panics will be eliminated, but then the government must replace banks in 
monitoring.  It may well be reasonable to assume that the government is not as effective as 
private banks in monitoring, so if the government monitors, then there is a cost, which may offset 
the benefits of eliminating panics.  We will analyze the welfare implications of these various 
policies. 
A.  Bank Liabilities as a Medium of Exchange 
We now turn to introducing a transactions role for bank liabilities.  We extend the above model, 
as follows.   
First, we introduce a new set of agents: sellers of goods.  Sellers are located at different locations, 
indexed by s∈  [0, S], where s is the distance from the consumers/depositors.  Each seller can 
produce a consumption good at a constant cost of one unit.  There are many sellers at each 
location, so the markets for consumption goods at different locations are competitive and the 
price of a consumption good is always one.  We assume that the markets for consumption goods 
close shortly after date 1 and it takes time for consumers to find the consumption goods they 
prefer. Consumers cannot carry their date 0 endowments to the distant locations because their 
endowments are perishable. Neither can they trade the withdrawals from banks (at date 1 or date 




them to locate the sellers before the markets are closed. Therefore the only way to buy the 
consumption goods at a distant location is to travel to the place at date 0 and pay for the goods 
with bank deposits.  When a seller sells a good to a depositor/consumer, the seller will receive a 
claim on a distant bank.  Clearing bank liabilities is assumed to be costless, as long as sellers 
accept them.  
Next, to capture an idea of a division of labor and a preference over goods of different types, we 
assumed that the consumers/depositors prefer products purchased further away from their 
hometown.  So, “s” also represents depositors’ taste.  We modify the depositors’ utility function 
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Note trade can only occur with bank deposits, so we have s=0 if c0>0 or if c2>0. 
As before, consumers/depositors have a subsistence level of one unit, but now they prefer larger 
s.   If s=0, then the consumer/depositor is simply consuming one unit of the consumption good 
purchased at the home location, and the utility function is as before.  According to the utility 
function, consumers have a taste for goods purchased some distance from the home location, so 
they must travel to make purchases.  Similar ideas are modeled in Lucas (1980), Wallace (1988), 
and Gorton (1996).  Note that s is not proportional to the quantity of consumption.  In addition, 
we assume there is a round-trip traveling/search cost: C(s)=κ s
2, which is non-pecuniary.  This 
cost is associated with shopping for the consumption good. 
Implicitly, the notion of traveling to shop introduces three new ideas, though they are in the 
background.  First, we implicitly introduce heterogeneous goods, because goods are now indexed 
by distance from the consumer/depositor’s home location.  Linking good-type to distance of 
search implicitly suggests that searching for goods that the consumer really likes is costly.  This is 
captured by costs specified above.  Second, goods can only be purchased with bank liabilities.  
We assume that consumers cannot carry their own endowments to the distant location and trade 
with sellers because their endowments are perishable.  So, barter is ruled out, which seems quite 
realistic.  Third, by assuming that markets close shortly after date 1, we essentially assume that 
depositors have to find sellers before economic uncertainties are resolved and introduce the 
possibility that markets might be disrupted. At the time a consumer meets a seller, the 




whether to accept bank deposits.  Imagine that the consumer is at the distant location and there is 
a state of macroeconomy in which a panic is needed to prevent bankers from engaging in moral 
hazard.  Then, the consumer’s bank claim (note or deposit) will not be accepted by sellers 
because sellers sell to consumers from different places, and they cannot go to different places to 
run on different banks at the same time. If sellers cannot accept bank claims and run on banks, 
then depositors themselves have to go back to run on banks. Once they travel back and obtain 
loan certificates, depositors will not have a second chance to buy their preferred goods at distant 
locations because they have no time to find a seller before markets are closed.  Therefore, while a 
panic is desired to prevent the moral hazard problem, it disrupts the markets for consumption 
goods at the same time. 
Since the model is one of a representative agent, when there is a panic the consumers/depositors 
return to their banks and demand that their claims be redeemed for one unit of endowment.  There 
is no issue of the consumers/depositors arriving at different times and having their claims honored 
sequentially.  In fact, this would not matter in any case since all of their claims can be honored by 
assumption.  Thus, the cause of panics in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the sequential service 
constraint, is not an issue here.   In the model here depositors’ withdrawals are not motivated by 
beliefs about (sunspots that are believed to be related to) the actions of other depositors.  Rather, 
they are only motivated by the desire to prevent the moral hazard problem, to monitor bankers.  
The assumed structure of preferences motivates depositors to avoid the moral hazard problem. 
The sequence of events is recapitulated as follows: 
1.  At date 0, consumers/depositors consumer their one unit of endowment of or save it 
by depositing it in the bank.  They are promised one unit from banks at either date 1 
or date 2, at the consumer/depositor’s discretion. They decide to search/travel to buy 
consumption goods (the cost is sunk) at a distant location. 
2.  At date 1, while depositors are at the distant location, the macroeconomic state is 
revealed. 
3.  If there is no need for a panic, consumers/depositors pay for their purchase with a 
bank liability drawn on their home location bank, which is then costlessly cleared.  If 
a panic is needed, then (in equilibrium) depositors have to go back to their home 
location to liquidate their bank, receiving loan certificates and consuming home 





Before we solve the banks’ profit maximization program under different types of banking 
systems, we first solve for the consumers/depositors’ optimal choice of s, the distance to travel at 
date 1, given that the promised payment from the banks is equal to one, and also taking as given 
the probability of panic η .  The probability of panic, η , will be determined in equilibrium and will 
vary depending on the type of banking system we are in, as analyzed below.  At date 1, 
consumers/depositors have one unit on deposit at the bank that can be spent on consumption 
goods.  They choose s to solve the following optimization problem, recognizing the travel cost is 
given by C(s)=κ s
2:  
 
Max s    (1-η )(1+s-κ s
2)+ η (1-κ s
2). 
 
The solution is given by: 
 














Proof:  It is trivial to show that the objective function is strictly concave in s.  The first order 





.   Substituting in s* to get 
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For future reference, we note that: 
 
Lemma 2: The optimal distance to travel and depositors’ utility is decreasing in the probability 
of panic η . 
 
The specification of preferences over distant goods, and the cost of traveling to these locations, 
has introduced a cost of a bank panic.  Our interpretation is that the payments system in disrupted, 
causing a decline in utility.  This is because when there is a banking panic, distant markets are 




they have to pay depositors one unit in any case.  There is no way for the banks to extract the 
depositors’ additional utility benefit from traveling to the distant locations to shop. 
 
The cost of panics generates a possible reason for the government to intervene into the banking 
system, possibly eliminate panics, and improve social welfare.  There are two distinct costs that 
arise.  First, the possibility of panic introduces the chance that there will be no trade at the distant 
location.  Since sellers cannot travel to run banks, they will not accept bank liabilities in exchange 
for goods if the macroeconomic state is in a panic state.  No trade lowers utility.  This effect is 
independent of the cost of traveling/searching, C(s).  Second, because of the cost, C(s), 
consumers/depositors, recognizing that there is a chance of no trade occurring, reduce 
travelling/searching intensity s ex ante (Lemma 2). 
 
We now proceed by analyzing the social welfare associated with different regulatory systems.  
Social welfare is defined as the sum of banks’ payoffs and depositors’ utility.  As mentioned 
above, we analyze three banking systems.  First, we recapitulate the private bank coalition 
system, analyzed by Gorton and Huang (2001).  Next, we consider a system under which the 
government enforces reserve requirements that reduce the likelihood of panic at date 1.  Finally, 
we analyze a system of government deposit insurance combined with the government monitoring 
banks at date 1.  We seek to learn how the government can improve social welfare.  
 
A.  The Private Bank Coalition 
 
If there is no government intervention, bankers do not internalize the cost of market failure 
caused by panics.  The optimization problem for the bank coalition is given in Gorton and Huang 
(2001).  To be clear, the optimization problem is restated here.  Note when π  is less than π
r, panic 
occurs and the coalition is forced to liquidate a fraction x of its member banks. 
Maxα ∫ + − + + − − + + − + +
r
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Gorton and Huang (2001) solve the bank coalition problem to determine the optimal level of 
reserves.  That solution does not change here.  We use α
C to denote the optimal reserve level. The 
following proposition gives the social welfare under the private bank coalition system. 
 
Proposition 1: Let α
C denote the optimal reserve level for the private bank coalition system. 
Panic occurs with probability  )
- f
1
( A ) ( A L C
C
L
r C π −
) α β + )(1 − (1
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equal to 
∫ + + + − − + + − + +
r
L
dF M x x Q x
C C C C C C π
π
π π α β α β α ) ~ ( )] ) 1 ( )( 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( [









) 1 ( 2 C
, where 










, 1 min{ , 0 max{ −
) + )(1 − (1








α β π α
 
 
Proof:  If α
C is the optimal reserve level, the panic occurs when the macroeconomic state π  is 
less than the critical value 
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, and social welfare is just the sum of the banks’ surplus and the depositors’ utility.  // 
 
Because the individual banks and their coalition cannot extract the additional utility that 
depositors get from consuming goods produced at distant locations, the cost of panic is not 
internalized. The proposition simply calculates the implied probability of panic for that solution 
so that social welfare can be calculated.  We will use this as a benchmark against which to 







B.  A Government Required Reserve Level 
 
Since the private bank association system fails to internalize the cost of market failure, i.e., the 
failure of the transaction media, the government can internalize the cost by imposing a minimum 
reserve level for banks at date 0.  By imposing such a required reserve level, the government 
forces banks to hold more reserves, and thereby lowers the probability of panic. This results in a 
decrease in the bankers’ payoff and an increase in the depositors’ utility. The government chooses 
the reserve level, α , to solve the following problem: 
Maxα ∫ + − + + − − + + − + +
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The solution is given by: 
 
Proposition 2: The government's objective function has a unique maximum in the interval 
] , 0 [ α .  Moreover, if κ  is big enough, the government’s objective function is strictly concave in 
α  and there exists a unique solution,  ] , 0 [ α α ∈ ,  that solves the government’s optimization 
problem. 
 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
Since the government does take consumers/depositors’ welfare into account, unlike the private 





Proposition 3: Government intervention with the required reserve level dominates the private 
coalition system by imposing a higher reserve level.    
 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
By imposing a required reserve level, the government decreases the probability that panic occurs, 
but cannot eliminate panics.  Panics are still needed for bankers to monitor and coinsure each 
other when the economy is in low states, though the set of low states over which there be a panic 
is reduced. 
 
Perhaps it would be better to eliminate panics altogether.  If panics are to be eliminated, then 
some agent must still monitor the banks.  Since the role of panics is to cause banks to monitor 
each other, the elimination of panics must, at the same time, involve a scheme for bank 
monitoring.   Suppose the government were to take over the task of monitoring the banks.  If the 
government can monitor the banks, it can prevent bankers from engaging in fraud and there is no 
need for depositors to run banks.  In other words, the government can make the depositors’ 
deposits safe by monitoring the banks.  This is equivalent to the government providing deposit 
insurance.  We proceed to analyze social welfare under such a deposit insurance system. 
 
C. Deposit Insurance 
 
Suppose the government insures that deposits will always be worth one unit.  To make this claim 
credible the government must monitor banks.  Reasonably, the government may have a 
disadvantage in collecting information about the banks’ idiosyncratic shocks, r.  To reflect this 
disadvantage, we assume there is a cost C for the government to learn the banks’ idiosyncratic 
shocks and to implement transfers between banks.  Let us suppose that each bank holds a reserve 
level α  and that the macroeconomic state is low so that the government needs to monitor the 
banks.  Then the government works as the banker of a Big Bank.  It closes a fraction x of the 
banks and taxes some of the (1-x) non-liquidated banks while subsidizing the other non-
liquidated banks.  In doing so, the government has to meet its budget constraint: 
 





The left-hand side consists of three parts: reserve α , liquidation proceeds (1+β−α) xQ, and the 
cash flow from non-liquidated banks (1+β−α) (1-x)(π+(1+ x)Μ).   The right-hand side also consists 
of three parts: the one unit promised payment to depositors, a payoff to the  non-liquidated banks 
f(1+β−α) (1-x)(π+(1+ x)Μ),   and the government’s monitoring cost C. We make the following 
assumption on information collection cost C to ensure that there is a unique x ∈ [0,1] that solves 
the above equation whenever some banks have incentives to engage in fraud. 
 
Assumption 5. (1-f)(1+β )M<C< (1+β )Q-1 
 
At date 1, the government chooses x, the fraction of banks to liquidate, to solve the following 
problem: 
Max x α  +(1+β−α) xQ + (1+β−α)  (1-x)(π+(1+ x)Μ ) -C 
             s.t.     α  +(1+β−α) xQ+(1+β−α) (1-x)(π+(1+ x)Μ)  ≥  1+ f(1+β−α) (1-x)(π+(1+ x)Μ)+ C 
                  x ∈ [0,1]. 
The solution is given by: 
 
Lemma 3: There is a unique  ] 1 , 0 [ x∈ that solves the above problem. The unique solution is: 
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 Moreover, x is increasing in C. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
The government’s problem at date 0 can now be written as:  
Maxα ∫ + − − + + − − + + − + +
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Solving the government’s problem gives the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: The government's objective function has a unique maximum in the interval 
] , 0 [ α .  Moreover, if C is small enough, the government’s objective function is strictly concave 
in α  and there exists a unique solution,  ] , 0 [ α α ∈ , that solves the government’s optimization 
problem. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The central bank deposit insurance works as follows. At date 1, the state of the macroeconomy is 
realized and the central bank calculates whether there are any banks with an incentive to engage 
in fraud. If the state of the macroeconomy is low and some banks have incentives to engage in 
moral hazard, then the central bank monitoring and insurance system is triggered. The central 
bank first monitors every individual bank to learn the realization of idiosyncratic shocks.  Then it 
closes some of the banks (banks with idiosyncratic shocks in the interval [0, xM]), and taxes and 
subsidizes the remaining banks.  Banks with  π −
α − β + −
α −
<
) 1 )( f 1 (
1
r  get subsidized and banks 
with  π −
α − β + −
α −
>
) 1 )( f 1 (
1
r  get taxed.  The final payoff to liquidated banks is equal to zero and 
to non-liquidated banks with idiosyncratic shock r is equal to f(1+β−α) (π+ r).  The information 
collection cost C is paid from the liquidation proceeds and taxes.     
Finally, we need to find out whether the government should provide deposit insurance to get rid 
of panics. This can be done by comparing the social welfare under the required reserve system 




Proposition 5: The smaller the information collection cost C and the traveling cost κ  are, the 
more likely that government deposit insurance is preferred. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
Banking panics are not an inherent feature of banks.  Rather, panics occur in certain kinds of 
banking systems.  Banking panics can cause incentive compatible private bank coalitions to arise 
to issue private coalition money, a sort of deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort.  These 
points were made by Gorton and Huang (2001).  We extend their model to show how government 
intervention into the banking system may be justified when the industrial organization of the 
banking system is such that there are many small, independent, unit banks.  Bank liabilities, bank 
notes and bank deposits, function as a transaction medium.  But, when there is a panic, this 
transactions system is disrupted, causing a loss of welfare.  Banks do not take this cost into 
account when they organize their coalition.   The government, however, can take this cost into 
account.  If the government can monitor banks at a sufficiently low cost, then a system of deposit 








Proof of Proposition 2:  The central bank’s optimization problem is: 
Maxα ∫ + − + + − − + + − + +
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Rewrite the objective function as G(α )+H(α ), where: 
∫ + − + + − + − + + =
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From the proof of the private coalition’s problem (see Gorton and Huang (2001)), we know that 
























π , we have 
H’(α )=  0
d
d







π − π −
κ
−  
H’’(α )=  0
d
d



























Therefore the objective function G(α )+H(α ) is not necessarily concave.  However, since 
G(α )+H(α ) is continuous in  ] , 0 [ α , and it has a finite value when α =0 and  α α = , there is a 
finite maximum in the interval  ] , 0 [ α . G’’(α )+H’’(α )<0 when κ  is sufficiently large enough. 
Therefore there can be a unique interior optimal reserve level,  ] , 0 [ α α ∈ ,  that solves the 
coalition's optimization problem.  // 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: The optimal reserve level for the private coalition α
C is feasible for the 
central bank. When α <α
C, we have G(α )<G(α
C) because G(α ) reaches its maximum at α
C, and 
we also have H(α )<H(α
C) because H(α ) is increasing in α . Therefore, the optimal reserve level 
under central bank intervention is always higher than the one under the private coalition and the 
central bank intervention with the required reserve level dominates the private coalition.  // 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: Let F(x)= α  +(1+β−α)  xQ + (1+β−α)(1− f)(1-x)(π+(1+ x)Μ)  -1-C .  
F(x) is a continuous quadratic function of x.  By assumption 5 we have F(0)<0 and F(1)>0. 
Therefore, there exists solutions in the interval [0, 1] for the equation F(x)=0.  The solution is the 
smaller root of the quadratic equation, which is: 
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Proof of Proposition 4: The Central Bank’s problem at date 0 is:  
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Therefore V(α ) is a strictly concave function of α.  
 
On the other hand, -CA(π
r-π L) is convex in α  because π
r   is concave in α .  Therefore, the 
objective function is concave in α  if and only if C is small enough. Because the objective 
function is continuous and bounded for  ] , 0 [ α α ∈ , there always exists a unique solution.  // 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: Social welfare under the deposit insurance system is decreasing in the 
information cost C.  Social welfare under the required reserve system is independent of the 
information cost C.  Therefore the smaller C is, the more likely that deposit insurance dominates 
required reserve.  On the other hand, if we fix C and let the traveling cost, κ,  change, since then 
the optimal reserve level in the deposit insurance system does not depend on κ,  the difference in 
optimal social welfare under the two systems is decreasing in κ .  The smaller k is, the more likely 
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1 Suppose the banker has reserves of α  and the realized idiosyncratic shock is r=0.  The 
realized state of the macroeconomy is π .  If the banker does not engage in fraud, he earns 
π (1+β -α )+α -1.  If he engages in fraud he earns π f(1+β -α ), since he cannot steal anything 
from the reserves.  If  π f(1+β -α )>π (1+β -α )+α -1, or 




1 , the banker 
engages in fraud. Otherwise he has no incentive to engage in fraud. 
 
2 At date 1, each member bank of the coalition holds reserves of α  when the state of the 
economy π  is realized.  If 




1  ,  then even the bank with the lowest 
idiosyncratic shock (i.e., r=0) has no incentive to engage in fraud.  Hence there is no need 
for depositors to run the banks.  If 




1 , then some banks have an incentive 
to engage in fraud.  
 
3 In order to prevent a banker with idiosyncratic shock r from engaging in fraud, the 
coalition has to promise him a payoff of at least f(1+β -α )(π +r).  Therefore, in order to 
convince depositors that their deposits are safe if they accept clearinghouse loan 
certificates, the coalition has to satisfy the following condition: 
∫ − + π α − β + + α
M 2
M 2 x
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M 2 x
) r ~ ( dF ) r )( 1 ( f .  Solving for x, we can rewrite 
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Therefore, imposing this condition, in order to convince depositors that the remaining 
banks have no incentives to engage in fraud, the coalition must liquidate a fraction, x, of 
the member banks such that  }} 1
- f M
- f 1
, 1 min{ , 0 max{ ) , ( * x x −
) α β + )(1 − (1
) α β + )(1 − (1 π − α −
≡ π α ≥ .  